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Abstract. Cloud services provide the ability to provision virtual net-
worked infrastructure on demand over the Internet. The rapid growth
of these virtually provisioned cloud networks has increased the demand
for automated reasoning tools capable of identifying misconﬁgurations
or security vulnerabilities. This type of automation gives customers the
assurance they need to deploy sensitive workloads. It can also reduce
the cost and time-to-market for regulated customers looking to establish
compliance certiﬁcation for cloud-based applications. In this industrial
case-study, we describe a new network reachability reasoning tool, called
Tiros, that uses oﬀ-the-shelf automated theorem proving tools to ﬁll this
need. Tiros is the foundation of a recently introduced network security
analysis feature in the Amazon Inspector service now available to millions
of customers building applications in the cloud. Tiros is also used within
Amazon Web Services (AWS) to automate the checking of compliance
certiﬁcation and adherence to security invariants for many AWS services
that build on existing AWS networking features.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing provides on-demand access to IT resources such as compute,
storage, and analytics via the Internet with pay-as-you-go pricing. Each of these
IT resources are typically networked together by customers, using a growing
number of virtual networking features. Amazon Web Services (AWS), for exam-
ple, today provides over 30 virtualized networking primitives that allow cus-
tomers to implement a wide variety of cloud-based applications.
Correctly conﬁgured networks are a key part of an organization’s security
posture. Clearly documented and, more importantly, veriﬁable network design
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is important for compliance audits, e.g. the Payment Card Industry Data Secu-
rity Standard (PCI DSS) [10]. As the scale and diversity of cloud-based services
grows, each new oﬀering used by an organization adds another dimension of pos-
sible interaction at the networking level. Thus, customers and auditors increas-
ingly need tooling for the security of their networks that is accurate, automated
and scalable, allowing them to automatically detect violations of their require-
ments.
In this industrial case-study, we describe a new tool, called Tiros, which
uses oﬀ-the-shelf automated theorem proving tools to perform formal analysis of
virtual networks constructed using AWS APIs. Tiros encodes the semantics of
AWS networking concepts into logic and then uses a variety of reasoning engines
to verify security-related properties. Tools that Tiros can use include Souffle´
[17], MonoSAT [3], and Vampire [23]. Tiros performs its analysis statically: it
sends no packets on the customer’s network. This distinction is important. The
size of many customer networks makes it intractable to ﬁnd problems through
traditional network probing or penetration testing. Tiros allows users to gain
assurance about the security of their networks that would be impossible through
testing.
Tiros is used directly today by AWS customers as part of the Amazon
Inspector service [11], which currently checks six Tiros-based network reach-
ability invariants on customer networks. The use of Tiros is especially pop-
ular amongst security-obsessed customers, e.g., the world’s largest hedge fund
Bridgewater Associates, an AWS customer, recently discussed the importance of
network veriﬁcation techniques for their organization [6], including their usage
of Tiros.
Related Work. Several previous tools using automated theorem proving have
been developed in an eﬀort to answer questions about software deﬁned networks
(SDNs) [1,2,5,12,13,16,19,25]. Similar to our approach, these tools reduce the
problems to automated reasoning engines. In some cases, they employ over-
approximative static analysis [18,19]. In other cases, they use general purpose
reasoning engines such as Datalog [12,15], BDD [1], SMT [5,16], and SAT
Solvers [2,25]. VeriCon [2], NICE [8], and VeriFlow [19] verify network invari-
ants by analyzing software-deﬁned-network (SDN) programs, with the former
two applying formal software veriﬁcation techniques, and the latter using static
analysis to split routes into equivalence classes. SecGuru [5,16] uses an SMT
solver to compare the routes admitted by access control lists (ACLs), routing
tables, and border gateway protocol (BGP) policies, but does not support full-
network reachability queries. In our approach we employ multiple encodings and
reasoning engines. Our SMT encoding is similar in design to Anteater [25] and
ConﬁgChecker [1]. Anteater performs SAT-based bounded model checking [4],
while ConﬁgChecker uses BDD-based ﬁxed-point model checking [7]. Previous
work has applied Datalog to reachability analysis in either software or network
contexts [12–14,24]. The approach used in Batﬁsh [13,24] and SyNET [12] is
similar to our Datalog approach; they allow users to express general queries
about whole-network reachability properties using an expressive logic language.
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Batﬁsh presents results for small but complex routing scenarios, involving a few
dozen routers. SyNET [12] also uses a similar Datalog representation of network
reachability semantics, but rather than verifying network reachability properties,
they provide techniques to synthesize networks from a speciﬁcation. The focus in
Tiros’s encoding is expressiveness and completeness; it encodes the semantics of
the entire AWS cloud network service stack. It scales well to networks consisting
of hundreds of thousands of instances, routers, and ﬁrewall rules.
2 AWS Networking
AWS provides customers with virtualized implementations of practically all
known traditional networking concepts, e.g. subnets, route tables, and NAT
gateways. In order to facilitate on-demand scalability, many AWS network fea-
tures focus on elasticity, e.g. Elastic Load Balancers (ELBs) support autoscaling
groups, which customers conﬁgure to describe when/how to scale resource usage.
Another important AWS networking concept is that of Virtual Private Cloud
(VPC), in which customers can use AWS resources in an isolated virtual net-
work that they control. Over 30 additional networking concepts are supported
by AWS, including Elastic Network Interfaces (ENIs), internet gateways, transit
gateways, direct connections, and peering connections.
Figure 1 is an example AWS-based network that consists of two subnets
“Web” and “Database”. The “Web” subnet contains two instances (sometimes
called virtual machines) and the “Database” subnet contains one instance. Note
that these machines are in fact virtualized in the AWS data center. The “Web”
subnet’s route table has a route to the internet gateway, whereas the “Database”
subnet’s route table only has local routes (within the VPC). In addition, each
of the subnets has an ACL that contains security access rules. In particular, one
of the rules forbids SSH access to the database servers.
Fig. 1. An example VPC network
AWS-based networks frequently start small and grow over time, accumulating
new instances and security and access rules. Customers or regulators want to
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make sure that their VPC networks retain security invariants as their complexity
grows. A customer may ask network configuration questions such as:
1. “Are there any instances in subnet ‘Web’ that are tagged ‘Bastion’?” or net-
work reachability questions such as:
2. “Are there any instances that can be accessed from the public internet over
SSH (TCP port 22)?”
To answer such questions we must reason about which network components are
accessible via feasible paths through the VPC, either from the internet, from
other components in the VPC, or from other components in a diﬀerent VPC via
a peering connection or transit gateway.
3 AWS Networking Semantics as Logic
Tiros statically builds a model of an AWS network architecture to check reach-
ability properties. The model of the network consists of two parts, the formal
specification and the snapshot of the network. The speciﬁcation formalizes the
semantics of the AWS networking components, e.g., how a route table directs
traﬃc from a subnet, in which order a ﬁrewall applies rules in a security group,
and how load balancers route traﬃc. The snapshot describes the topology and
details of the network. For example, the snapshot contains the list of instances,
subnets, and their route tables in a particular VPC (or set of VPCs). To answer
reachability questions, Tiros combines the formal speciﬁcation, the snapshot,
and a query into a formula that represents the answer. Tiros uses up to three
reasoning engines to answer queries: the Datalog solver Souffle´ [17], the SMT
solver MonoSAT [3], or the ﬁrst-order theorem prover Vampire [23]. Due to
the diﬀering limitations and capabilities of each of these tools, we maintain three
independent encodings of network semantics into logic, one for each of solver.
Datalog Encoding. In the Datalog encoding, a network model is a set of Datalog
clauses (stratiﬁed, possibly recursive or negated Horn clauses without function
symbols) using the theory of bit vectors to describe ports, IPv4 addresses, and
subnet masks. The specification part of the network model contains types, pred-
icates, constants, and rules that describe the semantics of the networking com-
ponents in Amazon VPCs. The speciﬁcation of Amazon VPC networks maps to
approximately 50 types, 200 predicates, and over 240 rules. For example, a spec-
iﬁcation of the semantics of SSH tunneling is deﬁned recursively: An instance
can SSH tunnel to another instance iﬀ it can either SSH to it directly, or through
a chain of intermediate instances. We express this with predicates canSshTunnel
and canSsh, of the type Instance × Instance, and rules:
canSshTunnel(I1, I2) ← canSsh(I1, I2).
canSshTunnel(I1, I2) ← canSshTunnel(I1, I3) ∧ canSshTunnel(I3, I2).
The snapshot part of the network model contains constants and facts (ground
clauses with no antecedents) that describe the conﬁguration of a speciﬁc AWS
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network. Constants have the form typeid. For example, the snapshot of a network
with an instance with id 1234 in a subnet with id web consists of the constants
instance1234 and subnetweb, and the fact hasSubnet(instance1234, subnetweb).
We illustrate the Datalog encoding using examples from Sect. 2. The network
conﬁguration question, q(I), is encoded as q(I) ← hasSubnet(I, subnetweb) ∧
hasTag(I, tagbastion). The network reachability question, r(I, E), is encoded as:
r(I, E) ← hasEni(I, E) ∧ isPublicIP (Address) ∧
reachPublicTcpUdp(diringress,proto6, E,port22, Adress,port40000).
In our Datalog encoding, we use the theory of bitvectors to reason about
ports, IP addresses, and CIDRs. We use Souffle´ as our Datalog solver, but in
principle other Datalog solvers could also be used, so long as they also support
bitvectors. We direct the reader to our co-author’s dissertation (cf. Chapter
7 [28]) for a more detailed explanation of the Datalog encoding.
protocol bv:8
srcAdr bv:32
dstAdr bv:32
srcPort bv:16
dstPort bv:16
Fig. 2. (Left) The symbolic graph corresponding to the VPC in Fig. 1. (Right) A
simpliﬁed symbolic packet, composed of bitvectors.
SMT Encoding. Our SMT encoding models network reachability as a symbolic
graph of network components, along with one or more symbolic packet headers
consisting of bitvectors for the source and destination addresses and ports. A
symbolic graph consists of a set of nodes and directed edges, where the edges
may be traversable or untraversable. Predicate edge(u, v), where u and v are
nodes, is true iﬀ the corresponding edge is traversable. The assignment of the
edge(u, v) atoms in the formula determines which paths exist in the graph.
Figure 2 shows a symbolic graph corresponding to the VPC from Fig. 1. In our
encoding, nodes represent networking components (such as instances, network
interfaces, subnets, route tables, or gateways), and edges represent possible paths
that packets may take between those components (such as between an instance
and its network interface). Constraints between edge atoms and bitvectors in
the packet headers deﬁne the routes that a packet can take.
For example, our encoding introduces an edge between each network interface
node, Eni-a, and its containing Subnet-web node, edge(Eni-a,Subnet-web). As
shown in Fig. 3, we also introduce constraints that force edge(Eni-a,Subnet-web)
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to be false if the packet’s source address does not match the ENI’s IP address.
This ensures that packets leaving the ENI must have that ENI’s IP address as
their source address. Similar constraints ensure that packets entering the ENI
must have that ENI’s IP address as their destination address.
We encode reachability constraints into this graph using the SMT solver
MonoSAT [3], which supports a theory of ﬁnite graph reachability. Speciﬁcally,
we add a start and end node to the graph, with edges to the source components
of the query and from the destination components of the query, and then we
enforce a graph reachability constraint reaches(start, end), which is true iﬀ there
is a start-end path under assignment to the edge literals. To encode the query
“Are there any instances that can be accessed from the public internet over
SSH?”, we would add an edge from the start node to the internet, and from each
EC2 instance to the end node. Additionally, we would add bitvector constraints
forcing the protocol of the symbolic packet to be exactly 6 (TCP), and the
destination port to be exactly 22.
edge(Subnet-web,Eni-a)
edge(Eni-a, Subnet-web)
ip10.0.0.5
protocol bv:8
srcAdr bv:32
dstAdr bv:32
srcPort bv:16
dstPort bv:16
((srcAdr = 10.0.0.5) =⇒ ¬edge(Eni-a, Subnet-web))
((dstAdr = 10.0.0.5) =⇒ ¬edge(Subnet-web,Eni-a))
Fig. 3. A small portion of the VPC graph, with constraints over the edges between an
ENI and its subnet enforcing that packets entering or leaving the ENI have that ENI’s
source or destination address.
The SMT encoding described above is intended speciﬁcally for answering
network reachability queries, and does not currently take into account other
properties (such as tags) that would be required to model the more general
network conﬁguration queries supported by our datalog encoding.
First-Order Encoding. In our encoding for superposition solvers such as Vam-
pire [23], we translate each network conﬁguration question into a many-sorted
ﬁrst order logic problem that is unsatisﬁable iﬀ the answer to the question is true,
and each network reachability question into a FOL problem that only has ﬁnite
models, each corresponding to an answer to the question. For this encoding,
we assume that network conﬁguration questions have strictly yes/no answers,
while network reachability questions return lists of solutions. In addition to its
default saturation mode, Vampire implements a MACE-style [26] ﬁnite model
builder for many-sorted ﬁrst-order logic [27]. Thus we use Vampire both as a
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saturation-based theorem prover and a ﬁnite model builder, running both modes
in parallel and recording the result of the fastest successful run.
Our encoding begins with the same set of facts as were generated from
the network model by our Datalog encoding, represented here by the symbols
(A1, A2, . . .). From there, we handle network conﬁguration and network reach-
ability questions diﬀerently, with network-conﬁguration encodings optimized
for proof-by-contradiction, while reachability conﬁgurations are optimized for
model-building. Proof-by-contradiction for yes/no questions is potentially faster
than model-building, as intermediate variables need not be enumerated.
We encode a network conﬁguration question ϕ in negated form: A1 ∧ . . . ∧
An ⇒ ¬ϕ. If Vampire can prove a contradiction in the negated formula, then ϕ
holds. We encode a network reachability question ϕ into a formula of the form
A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ∧ (∀z¯)(q(z¯) ⇔ ϕ) ⇒ (∀z¯)q(z¯), where q is a fresh predicate symbol,
and z¯ are free variables of the network question ϕ. Each substitution of z¯ that
satisﬁes q corresponds to a distinct solution to the reachability question.
Our encoding targets Vampire’s implementation of many-sorted ﬁrst-order
logic with equality, extended with the theory of linear integer arithmetic, the
theory of arrays [22], and the theory of tuples [20]. We encode types, constants,
and predicates using Clark completion [9]. We direct the reader to our co-author’s
dissertation (cf. Chapter 5 [21]) for a more detailed explanation of the Vampire
encoding, including a detailed analysis of the performance trade-oﬀs considered
in this encoding.
4 Usage and Performance
In this section we describe the performance of the various solvers when used by
Tiros in practice. Recall that our MonoSAT implementation can only answer
reachability questions, whereas the other implementations also answer more gen-
eral network conﬁguration questions (such as the examples in Sect. 2).
In our experiments with Vampire, we found that the ﬁrst order logic encod-
ing we used does not scale well. As we were not able to obtain good performance
from our Vampire-based implementation, in what follows we only present the
experimental results for MonoSAT and Souffle´. We explain the poor perfor-
mance of the Vampire encoding mainly by the fact that large ﬁnite domains,
routinely used in network speciﬁcations, are represented as long clauses coming
from the domain closure axioms. Saturation theorem provers, including Vam-
pire, have a hard time dealing with such clauses.
Amazon Inspector. To compare the performance of Souffle´ and MonoSAT
in the context of the Tiros-based Amazon Inspector feature we randomly
selected 10,000 network snapshots evaluated in December 2018. On these queries
Souffle´ required 4.1 s in the best-case, 45.1 s in the worst case, with 50th-
percentile runtime of 5.1 s and 90th-percentile runtime of 5.5 s. MonoSAT
required 0.8 s in the best case, 2.6 s in the worst case, with a 50th-percentile
runtime of 1.39 s and 90th-percentile runtime of 1.79 s. To give the reader an
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idea of the relative size of the constraint systems solved, in the smallest case
our Souffle´ encoding consisted of 2,856 facts, and the MonoSAT encoding
consisted of 609 variables, 21 bitvectors, and 2,032 clauses. In the largest case,
our Souffle´ encoding consisted of 7517 facts, and the MonoSAT encoding
consisted of 2,038 variables, 21 bitvectors, and 17,731 clauses.
Scalability Tests. MonoSAT and Souffle´ scale to all queries evaluated
using Amazon Inspector. To help understand the limits of the Souffle´ and
MonoSAT-based backends on larger networks, in Fig. 4 we compare the perfor-
mance of the solvers on a series of artiﬁcially generated networks of increasing
size, with 100, 1000, 10,000, and 100,000 instances. In each case, the query is
“list all open paths from the Internet to any instance in the VPC”. We can
see from the ﬁgure that neither approach dominates. In most cases the Data-
log encoding is able to scale to 10,000 instances, but in no cases can it scale
to 100,000 instances. In most cases the SMT encoding is able to scale to net-
works with 100,000 instances, but for the ‘benchmark-2’ networks, MonoSAT
requires almost a full hour to solve the 10,000 instance network that Souffle´
solves in 81 s. The SMT encoding performs poorly on ‘benchmark-2’ because
that benchmark has a vast number of distinct feasible paths through the net-
work, each requiring a separate SMT solver call. Other benchmarks have fewer
distinct paths.
Fig. 4. Comparison of runtime in seconds for the diﬀerent solver backends. Each bench-
mark uses a diﬀerent color, e.g. Souffle´ on benchmark-1 is a solid blue line, and
MonoSAT on benchmark-1 is a dashed blue line. In these experiments, Souffle´
recompiles each query before solving it, which adds ≈ 45 s to the runtime of each
Souffle´ query. In practice this cost can be amortized by caching compiled queries.
(Color ﬁgure online)
Automating PCI Compliance Auditing. Many AWS services are built using other
AWS services, e.g. AWS Lambda is built using AWS EC2 and the various AWS
networking features. Thus within AWS we are using Tiros to prove the cor-
rectness of our own internal requirements. As an example, we use Tiros to
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partially automate evidence generation for compliance audits of Payment Card
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [10]. Tiros is used across the many
customer-facing AWS services that are built using AWS networking to establish
controls supporting PCI DSS requirements 1.2, 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.4, and 1.3.7a.
Custom Application. AWS’s Professional Services team works with some of the
most security-obsessed customers to use advanced tools such as Tiros to achieve
custom-tailored solutions. For example, as discussed in a public lecture [6],
Bridgewater Associates worked with AWS Professional Services to build a Tiros-
based solution which proves invariants of new AWS-based network designs before
they are deployed in Bridgewater’s AWS environment. Proof of these invariants
assures the absence of possible data exﬁltration paths that could be leveraged
by an adversary.
5 Conclusion
We have described the ﬁrst complete formalization of AWS networking semantics
into logic. For customers of AWS services, Tiros provides deep insights into AWS
networking. Via the incorporation of Tiros into the Amazon Inspector service,
millions of AWS customers are able to automatically and continuously maintain
their network-based security posture. They can now show compliance with secu-
rity requirements at a scale that was impossible before. Internally within AWS,
we are also able to automate some aspects of compliance evidence generation,
which lowers our costs and increases our ability to quickly launch new features
and services.
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